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NEED FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ON
TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS*
FRANK E. HOLMAN-
In order to understand the dangers of "Treaty Law" and its threat
to American rights and to the American form of government, it is
appropriate to review briefly the nature of the American form of
government as a constitutional republic and as a government of dele-
gated powers.
Until the adoption of the United States Constitution, never had a
government been organized on the principles that people as indi-
viduals are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights
as to life, liberty, and property (including the right to local self-
government), and that these rights are inherent in the individual
citizen, not a grant from government. Theretofore in history we had
frequently heard of the divine right of kings, but never of the divine
rights of the people. Governments had accorded freedom to the indi-
vidual citizen and local self-government to the people only when forced
to do so or when the sovereign for the time felt so inclined. The pre-
vious concept of the scope and power of a national government was
that it had inherent powers of its own and might grant or withhold
rights of the individual citizen as it saw fit. But by our Constitution
and Bill of Rights only-certain specific and limited functions were con-
ferred upon the officials of our national government. It was to be a
government of delegated powers, and the people forbade, and intended
to forbid, the federal government from doing anything not authorized
by the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
Although Lord Bryce, probably the greatest student of government
of his generation, declared that the American Constitutional Conven-
tion was "the greatest body of men that ever sat in a single chamber,"
the Constitution was not in all respects a perfect instrument. Pro-
vision was made for its amendment from time to time as the country's
needs and conditions might require. As of now, twenty-two amend-
ments have been added to the Constitution.
We know that even the framers of the Constitution were in dis-
agreement on certain points, both of substance and of language. Com-
promise was resorted to in order to get an instrument of constitutional
government completed and adopted. This was particularly true in
* This is the author's reply to the article The American Constitution and the
Treaty Making Power by the Honorable John J. Parker, Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which appeared in 1954 WASN.
U.L.Q. 115.
t Member of the Utah and Washington Bars.
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connection with the provisions of Article VI regarding the treaty-
making power.' The article provides that,
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
This treaty provision was subject to criticism from the beginning.
Patrick Henry attacked it at the Virginia ratifying convention:
To me this power appears still destructive; for they can make
any treaty.... Is it not paramount to the Constitution and every
thing?-
However, in the early years of the Republic and practically until
the organization of the United Nations, this treaty supremacy doc-
trine posed no great threat to American rights and the American
form of government. Treaties were confined to their traditional pur-
poses and were used to settle some pending dispute between nations,
to make alliances, to terminate wars, or to deal with commercial and
trade relations. Furthermore, they were negotiated and drafted by
experts who understood the law and language of treaty-making. These
experts were appointed for the negotiation of a particular treaty
which actually involved some definite international dispute or specific
matter under settlement. When Article VI was written into the Con-
stitution the treaty provisions were not intended to be used to change
domestic law for the citizens of this country or to change our form of
government. Thomas Jefferson understood that,
By the general power to make treaties, the Constitution must
have intended to comprehend only those objects which are usually
regulated by treaty, and cannot be otherwise regulated.... It
must have meant to except out of these the rights reserved to the
states; for surely the President and Senate cannot do by treaty
what the whole government is interdicted from doing in any way.
(Emphasis added.)3
Even Alexander Hamilton, the great Federalist, said,
The power of making treaties .... relates neither to the execution
of the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new ones .... Its
objects are, CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have the force
of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are
not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but agree-
ments between sovereign and sovereign.4
1. See MAcBRmv, TREATIES VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION 25-38 (1955), for a
history of the article at the Constitutional Convention.
2. 8 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THn FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 513 (2d ed. 1866).
8. JXm17ZSON, MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 110 (1868). See also, Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, March 27, 1796, in THE WRITINGS OF
THom1s Jrna=o 185 (Washington ed. 1861), setting forth Jefferson's and
Madison's views.
4. Tmc FDzRALST No. 75, at 557 (Hamilton ed. 1888) (Hamilton).
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Today, however, acting under the broad grant of power contained
in the Charter of the United Nations,5 the Economic and Social Coun-
cil, whose members have highly diverse concepts of law and govern-
ment, as well as fundamentally different theories of economics, can
propose practically any kind of treaty-world-wide as to scope and all-
comprehensive as to subject matter. The Council or its commissions
thus may constantly develop new proposals in the form of declara-
tions, treaties, and pacts dealing with the internal affairs of all na-
tions as to any economic, social, humanitarian, educational, cultural,
or health matters.
As early as January 1948 Director John P. Humphrey of the Divi-
sion of Human Rights, a subagency of the Economic and Social Coun-
cil, disclosed that what the Commission on Human Rights was pro-
posing constituted an intervention in matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of the member states. He boldly stated the whole revo-
lutionary nature of the program as follows:
What the United Nations is trying to do is revolutionary in char-
acter. Human rights are largely a matter of relationships be-
tween the state and individuals, and therefore a matter which has
been traditionally regarded as being within the domestic juris-
diction of states. What is now being proposed is, in effect, the
creation of some kind of supranational supervision of this rela-
tionship between the state and its citizens.0
Apparently, the theory of the Economic and Social Council is that
world peace may be achieved if, somehow, economic, social, humani-
tarian, educational, cultural, and health conditions are by declarations,
conventions, and treaties subjected to a world-wide standard of
equality. This theory is advanced even though the result may be to
bring the more advanced nations down to the level of the backward
nations in rights, legal concepts, and form of government, as well as
in economic, social, and other internal affairs.
Accordingly, the humanitarians in the Economic and Social Council
immediately began to remold the world by trying to provide through
such declarations, conventions, and treaties how each and every na-
5. U.N. CHARTER art. 62 provides:
1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and
reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educa-
tional, health, and related matters and may make recommendations
with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Mem-
bers of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.
2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all.
3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assem-
bly, with respect to matters falling within its competence.
4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United
Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its compe-
tence.
6. Humphrey, International Protection of Human Rights, 1948 ANNALs 21.
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tion should conduct its internal affairs. One of the first documents
produced under this program of world-wide reform was the so-called
Declaration of Human Rights, 7 approved by the United Nations As-
sembly in Paris in December 1948. This Declaration, among other
things, is a complete blueprint for socializing the world, including the
United States. Articles 23 through 27, for example, contain provisions
guaranteeing to everyone rights ranging from the right to "rest and
leisure" to the right to an "adequate" standard of living, including
food, clothing, housing, and medical care.
The Declaration was advertised as being only a declaration of as-
pirations, not a legal document. But there immediately arose a grow-
ing school of thought in the United Nations and elsewhere that the
Declaration was an authoritative interpretation of the economic and
social provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,8 which has
already been ratified as a treaty. Thus, the Declaration and the
Charter would have the effect of establishing the extraordinary doc-
trine that,
[O]nce a matter has become, in one way or another, the subject
of regulation by the United Nations, be it by resolution of the
General Assembly or by convention between member states at the
instance of the United Nations, that subject ceases to be a matter
being "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Member
States." As a matter of fact, such a position represents the official
view of the United Nations, as well as of the member states that
have voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.9
In addition, it should be recognized that the Human Rights Com-
mission has refused again and again to approve the inclusion of a
provision in the proposed Covenant on Human Rights0 covering the
basic American right to own private property and be secure in its
enjoyment against its arbitrary seizure by government. On March 3,
1954, the eighteen-nation Human Rights Commission voted to shelve
indefinitely all discussion of property rights. Does this not disclose
the extent to which the Commission is controlled by communists and
international socialists? Under our concept of freedom no man can
7. U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REC., 3d Sess., Resolutions, at 71 (1948).
8. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-60. Article 55, for example, provides:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic
and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related prob-
lems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.
9. Moskowitz, Is the U.N.'s Bill of Human Rights Dangerous? A Reply to
President Holman, 35 A.B.A.J. 283, 285 (1949).
10. See Draft Covenants on Human Rights, 13 U.N. BuLL. 253-57 (1952).
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be truly free who lacks the right to own property and be secure in its
enjoyment against arbitrary seizure by government.It may properly be noted here that the news releases in April
195511 reported that the upper house of the Indian Parliament, by
unanimous vote of all 139 members present, passed a constitutional
amendment giving the legislature, rather than the courts, the right
to fix the terms and conditions for the expropiiation of private prop.
erty and the amount of payment therefor, subject to no right of appeal
to the courts. The point is, this right of the legislature to seize private
property upon its own terms may be good for India because of the
large estates that need to be rapidly broken up. In the United States,
however, where our land ownership has largely developed through the
acquisition of comparatively small holdings by our citizens, the Indian
doctrine of arbitrary legislative seizure is contrary to our basic con-
cept that private property shall not be taken for public use without
due process and just compensation. This illustrates the basic difficulty
of attempting, through such a treaty-making process as proposed by
the Commission on Human Rights, to put all nations of the world on a
so-called equality with respect to the rights and freedoms of citizens.
The Chairman of the United Nations Human Rights Commission,
Mr. Charles Malik of Lebanon, as early as 1952, said, in regard to
the Commission's approach to its work,
I think a study of our proceedings will reveal that the amend-
ments we adopted to the old texts under examination responded
for the most part more to Soviet than to Western promptings.
For the second year an unsuccessful attempt was made to in-
clude an article on the right to own property... The concept of
property and its ownership is at the heart of the great ideological
conflict of the present day.... It seems incredible that in these
economic matters, which reflect indeed much more than mere
economic divergencies, the Western world is so divided on itself
as to be incapable of presenting a common front against Com-
munism.12
In December 1948 the United Nations Assembly also adopted the
,Genocide Convention13 which defines certain domestic offenses as in-
ternational crimes for which American citizens might be extradited-
transported overseas for a trial without a jury before an interna-
tional criminal court.14 Other provisions touching the domestic rights
11. See, e.g., St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 21, 1955, § 2, p. 1, col. 6.
12. Malik, Human Rights in the United Nations, 13 U.N. BULL. 248,251 (1952).
13. U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REC., 3d Ses., Annexes, Agenda Item No.
S2, at 501 (Doc. No. A/760/C.2) (1948).
14. It has been stated that this convention,[P]roposes ultimately to vest in an international criminal court jurisdiction
to try, convict, and sentence Americans, and any others, charged with the
offense of genocide, without the safeguards which our federal and state
constitutions guarantee to persons charged with domestic crimes.
Fed. Legis., A Case for the Bricker Amendment, 42 GEO. L.J. 262, 274 (1954).
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of American citizens are found in the Convention on Freedom of
Information."' The above proposals, and similar ones advanced by
the new school of internationalists, constitute a challenge to the basic
rights of American citizens under the prevailing judicial interpreta-
tions of the treaty-making power.
In the early United States Supreme Court cases it was indicated
that a treaty could not enlarge, amend, or override the Constitution
of the United States. In New Orleans v. United States, the Court
stated obiter that "Congress cannot, by legislation, enlarge the federal
jurisdiction, nor can it be enlarged under the treaty-making power."1 6
This case, involving a United States claim under a treaty of cession
with Louisiana to certain land which the City of New Orleans was
preparing to sell, is sometimes referred to as having invalidated a
treaty on the above ground, but the decision is explainable on the
basis that no title passed to the United States under the treaty.17 The
Court's reasoning on the treaty-making power is in any event in con-
diet with its later decision in Missouri v. Holland.8
In Doe v. Braden" certain Florida land was claimed under a grant
from Spain made before the property was acquired by the United
States under a treaty of cession annulling the previous conveyance.
The Supreme Court, in holding that such a claim was a political rather
than a judicial question, indicated that the Constitution was superior
to a treaty:
The treaty is therefore a law made by the proper authority,
and the courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any
of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United
States. (Emphasis added.) 20
And again, in Hauenstein v. Lynham,2 1 where the Court determined
that a Virginia statute regarding escheat of alien property had been
nullified by an American-Swiss treaty, it was suggested that there
were limitations upon the treaty-making power:
There are doubtless limitations of this power as there are of all
others arising under such instruments; but this is not the proper
occasion to consider the subject.22
Ten years later, the Supreme Court again supported the doctrine
of limited treaty powers in Geofroy v. Riggs.23 The treaty in question
permitted Frenchmen to inherit property if, under the applicable state
law, aliens were permitted to hold real estate. In interpreting the
15. U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REc., 7th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No.
29, at 25 (Doe. No. A/AC. 42/7/c.1) (1951).
16. 85 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736 (1836).
17. Id. at 787.
18. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See text supported by note 26 infr.
19. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853).
20. Id at 657.
21. 100 U.S. 488 (1879).
22. Id. at 490.
28. 188 U.S. 258 (1889).
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treaty, Justice Field, after determining that inheritance was a proper
subject for the exercise of the treaty power, clearly stated that the
treaty-making power was not to be treated as unlimited.2 '
In two earlier cases, 25 an important limitation on the treaty power
was recognized: a treaty may be abrogated by the enactment of a sub-
sequent federal statute clearly inconsistent with the treaty. Such a lim-
itation would, of course, have the salutary effect of preserving in the
people, through their elected representatives in Congress, the ultimate
power of preventing the President, with only the consent of the Sen-
ate, from making domestic law or supplementing or amending the
Constitution of the United States in contravention of the intent of
Congress. But even this limitation would always require a two-thirds
vote of both Houses to override presidential opposition.
Whatever protection the people had, or would have had, under the
developing judicial doctrine of the earlier decisions regarding proper
limitations upon the treaty-making power was largely swept away by
the broad language of Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland.20 The
State of Missouri had brought a bill in equity to prevent federal en-
forcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, which was en-
acted in pursuance of a treaty between the United States and Great
Britain. Previously, a federal statute, not in pursuance of a treaty,
that attempted to protect migratory birds was held to be beyond
the power of Congress by two federal district courts.27 The Supreme
Court held that, whereas congressional enactments must be made
in pursuance of the Constitution to be the supreme law of the land,
a treaty is the supreme law of the land if made merely under the
authority of the United States (apparently meaning the President and
two-thirds of the Senate present and voting) .28 Under the Holmes
concept, a treaty, unlike a federal statute, will be valid and will be the
supreme law of the land even though not made in pursuance of the
Constitution. The language of Article VI requiring a treaty merely
to be made under the authority of the United States, rather than in
pursuance of the Constitution, thus resulted in the Supreme Court
24. In discussing the limitations of the treaty power the Court pointed out
that,
It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in
that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the
latter, without its,,consent.
Id. at 267.
25. Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889) ; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190 (1888).
26. 252 U.S. 416.(1920).
27. United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288 (D. Kan. 1915) ; United States v.
Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
28. Justice Holmes stated that, "it is open to question whether the authority of
the United States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the con-
vention." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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holding that Congress may exercise legislative powers under a treaty
which it would have been constitutionally forbidden to exercise in the
absence of the treaty. Thus, Congress, pursuant to a treaty, may pass
any legislation that it deems "necessary and proper" to execute the
powers of government,2 9 regardless of the constitutional limitations
on Congress apart from the treaty. Therefore, the logical result of
Missouri v. Holland is that a treaty may enlarge and change the Con-
stitution itself and sweep away state constitutions and state laws in
the process.
Within a few years after the decision in Missouri v. Holland, the
distinguished former Justice Charles Evans Hughes, soon to become
Chief Justice, in an address before the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, said that there was in the Constitution "no explicit limi-
tation" on the treaty power and that he would "[N]ot care to voice
any opinion as to an implied limitation on the treaty-making power.
The Supreme Court has expressed a doubt whether there could be any
such."' 0
Five years later, in United States v. Reid,'31 in answer to the argu-
ment that the treaty in question violated the Constitution to the extent
that it deprived a minor child of citizenship without her consent, the
court said,
It is doubtful if courts have power to declare the plain terms of a
treaty void and unenforceable, thus compelling the nation to
violate its pledged word, and thus furnishing a causus [sic] belli
to the other contracting power.32
This doubt was further increased in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.,"3 which concerned the validity of a statute delegating
to the President the power to bar the sale of arms by Americans to
foreign countries. Although the treaty-making power was not directly
in issue, the Court declared that such power does not depend upon a
grant in the Constitution but is an inherent power of the federal
government-again the indication that the treaty power is un-
limited.3
Notwithstanding the early judicial dicta that the treaty power can-
not "authorize what the Constitution forbids," it seems clear that the
Supreme Court, without a constitutional amendment controlling the
effect of treaties, could hardly do otherwise than sustain almost any
type of treaty provision. At least it has uniformly done so. In fact,
29. See the discussion of the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitu-
tion in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
30. 1929 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 194.
31. 73 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1934).
32. Id at 155.
33. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
34. In Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924), the Sunreme Court held invalid
a city ordinance confining the pawnbroking business to United States citizens be-
cause of its conflict with a treaty permitting Japanese citizens to carry on trade in
the United States. This was the last case to repeat the dicta of the early cases
regarding the constitutional limitations on the treaty power. Id. at 341.
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the power of the courts to pass on the validity of treaties has been
doubted from the earliest times. Justice Chase in 1796 said that,
"If the court possesses a power to declare treaties void, I shall never
exercise it, but in a very clear case indeed."35 Courts have indicated
that the power does not exist,36 that the making of treaties "being an
exercise of political power," the courts have no "official concern"
therewith except as to their existence and construction.7 The Supreme
Court said in United States v. Pink that,
This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland, held that
the conduct of foreign relations is committed by the Constitution
to the political departments of the Federal Government; that the
propriety of the exercise of that power is not open to judicial
inquiry ... 8
The assertion that no treaty offending the Constitution has ever
been ratified overlooks the treaty proclaimed May 22, 1924,39 between
Great Britain and the United States permitting transportation of
liquor in British ships within the territorial limits of the United
States. Previously, this had been held by the Supreme Court to be
"prohibited transportation and importation in the sense of the [Eight-
eenth] Amendment and the [National Prohibition] act. '4 0 Professor
Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., has commented that, "President Coolidge
and the Senate evidently thought that a treaty could prevail over at
least one amendment."' 1 And it should be added, over an unqualified
constitutional prohibition.
Perhaps the most outstanding and most alarming example of the
effect of "Treaty Law" on our domestic law and Constitution, and
upon the thinking of our judges, is to be found in the opinion of
former Chief Justice Vinson in the decision dealing with the Presi-
dent's seizure of private property in the famous Steel Seizure case.2
The Court held that the executive order directing the Secretary of
Commerce to seize and operate the steel mills was not authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States. The Chief Justice,
in his dissent, advanced the doctrine that the United Nations Charter
and other international treaties and commitments, together with the
statutes implementing these treaties, authorized the President of the
United States to seize private property despite the lack of express con-
35. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1796).
36. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); United States v.
Reid, 73 F.2d 153, 155 (9th Cir. 1934).
37. Z. & F. Assets Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1940), aff'd, 311
U.S. 470 (1941); United States v. Domestic Fuel Corp., 21 C.C.P.A. (Customs)
600, 609, 71 F.2d 424, 430 (1934).
38. 315 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1942).
39. Treaty with Great Britain on Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating
Liquors, Jan. 23, 1924, 43 STAT. 1761, T.S. No. 685.
40. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 130 (1923).
41. Sutherland, Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1305, 1319(1952).
42. Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 667 (1952).
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stitutional authorization. Any analysis of the decision discloses that
the Chief Justice rested his opinion in substantial part squarely on the
duty of the President to execute treaties faithfully. His theory was
that if there was no applicable legislation by which President Truman
was bound, still, under the constitutional duty to "take care that the
laws be faithfully executed," the President had the duty to execute
faithfully the United Nations Charter and the NATO Treaty. The
Chief Justice drew no distinction between the President's power in
external and internal affairs, whereas Justice Jackson, in his con-
curring opinion,4 ' indicated that the majority recognized internal and
external affairs as being in separate categories. Of course the right
to own property and be secure in its enjoyment within the United
States is clearly an internal affair.
Thus, Missouri v. Holland and the subsequent cases have not only
nullified the dicta of the earlier cases in the minds of federal expan-
sionists, but have given rise to two remarkable doctrines: (1) the doc-
trine that the treaty power is unlimited, capable even of overriding
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and (2) the "bootstrap doc-
trine" of federal power, namely, that by its own voluntary act of mak-
ing a treaty with another nation the federal government can, appar-
ently without limit, increase its legislative power at the expense of the
states. Carried to its logical end, Missouri v. Holland means that un-
der Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter, 5 dealing with
the entire gamut of human activity in the civil, political, social, eco-
nomic, and cultural fields, the federal government is now one of un-
limited powers.
Mr. Dulles, in a speech at Louisville, Kentucky, before a regional
meeting of the American Bar Association in April 1952, summed up
the whole matter of the dangers of treaties under the present su-
premacy clause of Article VI of the Constitution:
The treaty making power is an extraordinary power, liable to
abuse. Treaties make international law and also they make do-
mestic law. Under our Constitution, treaties become the supreme
law of the land. They are, indeed, more supreme than ordinary
laws for congressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to
the Constitution, whereas treaty law can override the Constitu-
tion. Treaties, for example, can take powers away from the Con-
48. There has been a vigorous effort to deny that the dissenting opinion of the
Chief Justice was based on "Treaty Law." Senator Hayden took occasion to make
a strong attack against the writer, Dr. Clarence E. Manion, ex-dean of law, Uni-
versity of Notre Dame, and Ray Murphy, past commander of the American
Legion, for allegedly misrepresenting the legal effect of this opinion. 100 CONG.
RC. 1168 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1954). For a detailed answer to this criticism see
Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, Report, 79
A.B.A. REP. 540, 555 (1954).
44. Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 634, 635 n.2 (1952).
45. See note 8 supra.
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gress and give them to the President; they can take powers from
the States and give them to the Federal Government or to some
international body, and they can cut across the rights given the
people by their constitutional Bill of Rights. (Emphasis added.)'4
Under the American theory of government, our basic individual
rights belong to the American people as safeguarded by the Constitu-
tion. They are retained by the people even as against the government
itself and ought not to be subject to modification through the use of
the treaty-making process. Our own Bill of Rights forbids Congress
to change our basic rights, but as the Constitution now stands, it does
not prevent our basic rights from being changed by a treaty which is
made by the treaty-making agency, consisting merely of the President
and two-thirds of the Senators present and voting. This is the loop-
hole in the Constitution that we now face and through which the
internationalists propose to move to level out our American rights
(both state and individual) and thereby change our form of govern-
ment. The new school of internationalists say a treaty can be made
on any matter which international opinion deems to be of international
concern and that "human rights," social, economic, and political, are of
international concern.47 This new concept has led our State Depart-
ment to say officially that "there is no longer any real distinction be-
tween 'domestic' and 'foreign' affairs. ' 48 Because of this, and similar
declarations by Mr. Humphrey 9 and Mr. Moskowitz, 0 the provision
of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, 1 that nothing contained
therein shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in domestic
affairs, becomes meaningless.
Because of this broad activity in the international field based on the
growing doctrine of the "omnipotence of treaties," the American peo-
ple, unless there is a constitutional amendment, are faced with the
following legal predicament:
1. A treaty may completely, nullify a provision in a state constitu-
tion without the people of that itate having'any'voice in the matter,
either directly or through their state legislature, because Article VI of
the United States Constitution provides that a treaty is the
46. The speech is quoted in Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Conz.. Ist Sess. 862 (1953).
47. See e.g., Moskowitz, Is the U.N.'s Bill of Human Rights Dangerous? A
Reply to President Holman, 35 A.B.A.J. 283, 284 (1949).
. 48. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PuB. No. 3972, GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY SERIES 26,
at 4 (1950).
49. See text supported by. note 6 supra.
50. See note 47 supra.
51. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 provides:
Nothing contained in the present Chapter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domesticjurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters
to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not preju-
dice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
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"[S]upreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
2. A treaty may nullify a state statute or, for all practical purposes,
enact new laws binding on a state.
3. A treaty may nullify or change the effect of a decision of a state
supreme court.
4. A treaty may nullify or change the effect of existing federal legis-
lation on the same subject.
5. A treaty may enlarge, amend, or override the United States Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights. It is the writer's view that it can,
though this has been a question of great controversy.
Because of the grave threat to constitutional government in this
country, and in order to set at rest the difficulties that may arise from
the Supreme Court's new concept of "Treaty Law," it is not difficult
to understand why the American Bar Association, after several years
of consideration and full debate in its House of Delegates, concluded
that a constitutional amendment was necessary to preserve American
rights and the American form of government against the dangers of
treaties and executive agreements. 52
What is the general nature of the opposition to the proposal for a
constitutional amendment on treaties and executive agreements?
One source of opposition seems to be largely based upon the idea
that the American people can "trust" the administration now in power
not to make any bad treaties. As a token of the present administra-
tion's good faith, Mr. Dulles has testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee that the present administration would not press for ratifi-
cation of the Genocide Convention or the Covenant on Human Rights.
But he has said nothing about abandoning any of the scores of other
treaties being considered by the various agencies of the United Na-
tions, the International Labor Organization, and other international
groups.
Another source of opposition to the proposed amendment stems
from the contention that it would interfere with the power of the
President and the Department of State to negotiate treaties and other
international agreements. Supposedly, they would be prevented from
properly conducting our foreign affairs. It has even been broadly
stated by some opponents that under such an amendment a treaty
would have to be approved by the forty-eight states-that we would
be returned to the conditions that existed under the Articles of Con-
52. Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 38 A.B.A.J. 425, 435 (1952). The
following constitutional amendment was recommended to Congress: -
A provision of a treaty which conflicts with any provision of this Con-
stitution shall not be of any force or effect. A treaty shall become effective
as internal law in the United States only through legislation by Congress-
which it could enact under its delegated powers in the absence of such treaty.
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federation. An amendment limiting the treaty power would in no way
interfere with the free negotiation of treaties by the President and
the State Department and their subsequent ratification by the Senate.
The President would be as free to negotiate as now, and every treaty
so negotiated, when ratified by the Senate, would be immediately effec-
tive as an international agreement. The amendment would have no
restrictive force whatever on treaties as international obligations, nor
would it curtail the power of the President to negotiate them. The
amendment would permit treaties to become effective as internal law
within the United States to the extent that Congress legislates within
the delegated powers it has in the absence of any treaty. Thus, Con-
gress could bind the states, independently of their consent, to the terms
of a treaty, but only in those areas in which Congress has delegated
power. Naturally, this will exclude some areas in which treaties now
become internal law under the supremacy clause, and here the desired
result would have to be achieved by co-operation between Congress
and the state legislatures. Thus, the real objection to the amendment
in this area is that the constitutional relationship between the state
and federal government would be subject to change ouly by the regular
process of constitutional amendment. This could no longer be accom-
plished through the treaty power alone.53 The amendment would only
prevent treaties from violating the Constitution and from becoming
internal law within the United States until implemented by appro-
priate legislation."
Neither would the amendment affect the right of the President as
Commander in Chief to conduct war, negotiate an armistice, or to per-
form any other acts properly belonging to him as such. The Senate
Judiciary Committee which considered the matter found that such an
amendment would not affect in the least the President's powers in
this respect. 5
None of the arguments of the opposition, therefore, effectively meets
the issue that there exists a loophole in the Coiastitution whereby legis-
lative authority, without limitation, can be delegated to international
organizations. In a period of another twenty-five years, this may
result in the transference to a variety of world organizations of ex-
tensive legislative authority to make regulations, laws, and codes for
the American people in connection with many of their internal affairs.
Any draft of a constitutional amendment to protect American rights
53. Deutsch, The Need for a Treaty Amendment: A Restatement and a Reply,
38 A.B.A.J. 793, 795 (1952) ; Finch, The Treaty-Clause Amendment: The Case for
the Asociation, 38 A.B.A.J. 467, 527-30 (1952).
54. After extended hearings, the majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee
of the Eighty-Third Cnngress reached such a conclusion. S. REP. No. 412, 83d
Cong., lst Sess. 33 (1953).
55. Ibid.
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against the dangers of "Treaty Law" should, in my opinion, embody
the following purposes and objectives.
1. It should remove any possible doubt that a treaty or executive
agreement to be valid as domestic law must be consistent with the
Constitution and not in conflict with it. Unequivocal constitutional
effect should be given to judicial dicta to the effect that "Congress
cannot, by legislation, enlarge the federal jurisdiction, nor can it be
enlarged under the treaty-making power." '56 In addition, it should be
made clear that no provision of a treaty which violates any provision
of the Constitution or which is inconsistent with the nature of the
government of the United States or the relation between the states
and the United States shall be valid. Any inferences drawn by some
persons from Missouri v. Holland and United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp. that the treaty power is unlimited in any field, regard-
less of the Constitution, should be unqualifiedly negatived by such
amendment so that any doubt on this score will be forever set at rest.
2. The amendment should prevent a treaty or executive agreement
from becoming internal law in the United States by force of its self-
executing terms. This would remove the issue as to whether a treaty
is self-executing or non-self-executing from the realm of judicial
speculation and make the effectiveness of the treaty within the United
States depend exclusively on implementing legislation. In fact, the
United States is one of the few countries of the world whose legisla-
ture is not free to decide when, and to what extent, it wishes to imple-
ment a treaty by the passage of legislation. In the United States, when
an international agreement like the United Nations Charter, the Geno-
cide Convention, or the Covenant on Human Rights is ratified as a
treaty, it may supersede every city ordinance, county ordinance, state
law, state constitution, and federal statute on the same subject. Fur-
thermore, under the logical result of the Holmes doctrine in Missouri
v. Holland it may enlarge and amend the Constitution of the United
States.
3. The amendment should limit the language of the decision of
Missouri v. Holland by making it clear that in legislating in respect
to treaties Congress shall have no power which it does not already
have under the Constitution. The amendment should abrogate the
broad language in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. re-
garding an unrestricted federal power in the field of international
relations.
4. The amendment should make it inescapably clear that the limita-
tions in the first amendment restricting the power of "Congress" can-
.56. New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736 (1836); see
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) ; Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211,
242 (1872); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1870).
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not be escaped by use of the treaty-making power or executive agree-
ment under the claim that the President and Senate are a separate
agency for lawmaking, and thus not subject to constitutional limita-
tions on "Congress. ' ' 57
Several different drafts of amendments have been proposed. What-
ever the language used, the following are the minimum provisions
that should be included to protect American rights:
1. That no provision of a treaty or other international agreement
which conflicts with any provision of the Constitution of the
United States shall be valid.
2. That no provision of a treaty or other international agreement
shall be effective as internal law until implemented by appro-
priate legislation.
One over-all purpose of the amendment should be to give life and
effect to the provision in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, 8
which was intended to preserve and protect our American rights and
which has been ignored and nullified by the proposals of the United
Nations itself. With the adoption of such an amendment as proposed
the power of the American people over their domestic affairs would
be reasserted and re-established.
It is no mere rhetorical statement to say that America faces a great
constitutional crisis-one that threatens the very foundations of the
Republic. Lawyers, laymen, and the press are gradually rallying in
support of a constitutional amendment. The effect of trying to incor-
porate in an international document the rights and freedoms which
American citizens enjoy, and making them international rights sub-ject to international interpretation-thus giving foreign governments,
individuals, and pressure groups the right to challenge our own inter-
pretation of our own rights and even to challenge our right to the
protection of our own courts-constitutes, in my opinion, not only a
grave threat to American rights but an actual and present threat to
the independence of the United States. The internationalists and
humanitarians have certainly discovered a loophole in our Consti-
tution. As Henry St. George Tucker, a former president of the Ameri-
can Bar Association, has well stated, the present treaty clause is a
"Trojan horse" which is about to unload its hidden soldiery in our
midst. As the Peace and Law Committee of the American Bar Asso-
ciation has asserted, we need a constitutional amendment that will
.""drive the beast outside the walls without more damage done, and
with its remaining armored soldiery securely locked within."Go
57. Special Committee for Peace and Law Through United Nations, Report, 75
AB A. REP. 286, 306 (1950).
:58. See note 51 supra.
59. TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING PowEn 339 (1915).
.60. Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, Report,
77 A.B.A. REP. 510, 520 (1952).
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